Abdul.Quayyum.Khan.Kundi

Iran war & Imran Khan - Abdul Quayyum Kundi

When Iran prepared for a potential confrontation with the US and Israel, it did so with clear geopolitical and military objectives. Militarily, the aim was never outright victory in a conventional sense, but resilience — to absorb the bombing strikes without collapsing, and then respond in a way that imposed real costs on the adversary. They understood that asymmetric warfare was not just a choice, but their only viable strategy.

Geopolitically, Iran also sought to recalibrate the regional balance. The GCC states, despite their wealth, have limited independent military capacity and have maintained an adversarial and often dismissive posture toward Iran for over four decades. Tehran saw an opportunity to send a calculated message — to force a reassessment of their actual weight in regional power dynamics. By that measure, Iran appears to have achieved part of its objective.

Every crisis carries within it an opportunity. The current situation presents Pakistan with one such opening — though whether we have the clarity and capacity to seize it remains uncertain.

For Pakistan, this was not just Iran’s war; it was an existential concern. A prolonged conflict would have triggered soaring fuel prices, disrupted the flow of petrodollars that sustain the economy, reduced expatriate remittances, and risked capital withdrawals from GCC states that have long propped up foreign reserves. Faced with these realities, the hybrid regime predictably turned to diplomacy — not out of strategic vision, but out of desperate necessity.

While Pakistan’s diplomatic star shines brighter, there is little confidence that this diplomatic capital will translate into lasting national gain. History offers sobering lessons. In 1971, Pakistan facilitated the US–China opening but failed to convert that role into meaningful economic or military advantage. During President Trump’s first term, Pakistan helped enable the Doha Accord with the Afghan Taliban — yet the aftermath brought greater instability, with abandoned weapons now fueling militancy against Pakistan itself.

Today, Pakistan once again finds itself facilitating dialogue — this time between the US and Iran. But one must ask: if Iran eventually normalizes relations with the US and emerges as a strategic economic partner — as Vietnam and Japan once did after conflict — where does that leave Pakistan?

The uncomfortable truth is that Pakistan’s foreign policy has too often been reactive, personality-driven, impulsive, and strategically shallow. It serves those in power in the moment, rather than advancing long-term national interests.

For years, I have argued that no single Muslim-majority country possesses the strength to stand alone against external pressure and aggression. The logical path forward is collective security — a strategic bloc that creates deterrence through unity. Early in Imran Khan’s tenure, I proposed such a framework involving a small group of key states. To his credit, he immediately grasped the idea and moved to operationalize it, engaging leaders like Erdoğan and Mahathir and laying the groundwork for deeper coordination.

However, the initiative faltered. The exclusion of Saudi Arabia triggered resistance from a petrodollar-dependent establishment, which ultimately undermined the effort — even preventing Pakistan’s participation in the Kuala Lumpur summit. That moment marked a critical inflection point and foreshadowed deeper fractures to come. Imran Khan was forced out of office using palace intrigue.

Leaders like Imran Khan — much like Bhutto before him — recognized the strategic necessity of collective security in the Muslim world. With institutional backing, such a vision might have evolved into a meaningful deterrent framework — one that could have altered the trajectory of recent crises, from Gaza genocide to the broader regional instability resulting from Iran war. Not a single Muslim country came to Iran’s aid to stop unrestrained bombing of its citizens and infrastructure.

We cannot rewrite the past, but we can still shape the future. The ongoing crisis in the Middle East is not just a threat — it is an opportunity. Pakistan must move beyond short-term calculations and develop a coherent, long-term foreign policy doctrine — one that places economic strength, regional connectivity, and sustainable development at its core. Only then can it turn moments of crisis into milestones of national progress. I can share some ideas if the regime reaches out for it. If not, I wish them good luck.