DRS Chambers

Case details
Case: CRLA No. 452 of 1998
Court: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench
Bench: Hon’ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.
Date: April 2, 2026

Facts of the case

The offense was committed more than 50 years ago, with appellants convicted and sentenced for one year of RI and Rs 20000 fine under 120 B IPC and Section 5(2)read with Section 5(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act.

Appellant Nos. 3 and 5 were now aged 90 and 88 years respectively, with no subsequent offenses during the intervening period. The trial court omitted to consider the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, leading to the current appeal challenging conviction and seeking probation on grounds of advanced age and time elapsed.

Submission by Counsel of appellant

Counsel for the appellants Abhinav Srivastava argued that the lower courts failed to mandatorily consider Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, as per Supreme Court precedents, occasioning a failure of justice. He submitted that incarcerating 90-year-old and 88-year-old appellants after over half a century serves no reformative, preventive, or deterrent purpose. With a clean record for nearly four decades post-sentencing, full probation benefit should be extended without further supervision or fine recovery.

Order of the Court

The Hon'ble Bench disposed of the appeal by upholding the conviction of Appellant Nos. 3 and 5 but granting them the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. No incarceration or fine recovery was ordered , and no further probation period was imposed as nearly four decades have elapsed since sentencing with no other offenses committed. The court held this aligns with the reformative intent of the Act for such aged offenders.

Case laws relied

Keshav Sitaram Sali v. State of Maharashtra (1968)
Jugal Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar (1971)
R.K. Dalmia v. Delhi Administration

Edited by
Adv. Swati Sinha
DRS Chambers
High Court, Lucknow

Case details
Case: Nirmal Kumar v. State of U.P.
Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. 407 of 2019
Court: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench
Bench: Hon’ble Rajan Roy, J. and Hon’ble Brij Raj Singh, J.

Facts of the case
The prosecution story alleged that the victim, a 14-year-old mentally challenged girl, was left alone at home while her father was away, and the appellant, a neighbour, enticed her to his house and r***d her on 20 September 2010. It was further alleged that she later informed her father and relatives including mother and sister about the incident. She died on 23 September 2010 before the FIR was lodged three days after the incident.

The FIR was registered under Sections 376, 302 and 506 IPC. The trial court held the appellant guilty of 376 IPC.

Submission by Counsel of appellant

The trial judgment records that there was no direct evidence against the appellant and no one had actually seen him enticing the victim away or committing r**e. The defence also relied on the delay of three days in filing FIR , the absence of the victim’s recorded statement before police or Magistrate, the lack of medical proof linking the semen to the appellant, and the incomplete chain of circumstances. The appellant’s side also argued that criminal history alone could not prove guilt though the appellant had a history of 7 criminal cases.

Submissions by the Counsel of Respondent

The State represented by AAG Vimal Kumar Srivastava assisted by Raj Deep Singh AGA 1 argued that the victim’s statements to her father, sister and villagers amounted to relevant evidence and that the forensic report showing human semen on the vaginal swab of the victim supported the prosecution case. Reliance was placed on Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act and judgments including State of Maharashtra v. Bandu alias Daulat, Rattan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, Shyam Singh Hada v. State, and Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor.

The State contended that even if murder was not proved, the victim’s statement could still be relied as dying declaration to establish r**e .

Order of the Court
The Hon'ble High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction under Section 376 IPC, and acquitted the appellant. The Court held that the forensic evidence only showed sexual in*******se, not that the semen belonged to the appellant, and the oral statements relied upon were not legally sufficient in the facts of the case.

The statement of the girl was never recorded nor her mother was produced as a witness. The case was of circumstantial evidence and the chain of event was not complete so as to establish the guilt of the accused.

The appellant was directed to be released forthwith, subject to compliance with bond requirements under Section 437-A CrPC / Section 481 BNSS.

Case laws relied
The State relied upon these authorities: State of Maharashtra v. Bandu alias Daulat
Rattan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh Shyam Singh Hada and Ors. v. State
Pakala Narayana Swami v.
Emperor

Edited by
Adv. Swati Sinha
High Court, Lucknow

1. Details of the Case
Case: Km. Rukaiya Bano vs State of U.P. & Others
Court: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench
Case No.: Writ - A No. 2765 of 2026
Coram: Hon’ble Justice Manish Mathur
Date of Judgment: 13 March 2026

2. Facts of the Case

The petitioner approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a direction to the concerned authorities to consider her medical reimbursement claim for expenses incurred during treatment.
The claim was rejected by the State authorities solely on the ground that it had not been submitted within a period of 30 days from the commencement of treatment as required under Paragraph 11(Kha) of the Government Order dated 27.12.2016. It is pertinent to note that apart from this delay, no other deficiency or ground for rejection of the petitioner’s claim was indicated in the written instructions produced before the Court.

3. Submissions by Counsel for the Petitioner

counsel for the petitioner submitted that the rejection of the claim merely on account of delay was arbitrary and unsustainable in law. It was contended that the requirement of submitting intimation within 30 days is not mandatory but directory in nature, particularly in light of the expression “यथासंभव” (as far as possible) used in the provision. It was further argued that medical reimbursement provisions are beneficial in nature and intended to secure reimbursement of genuine medical expenses incurred by employees, and therefore such provisions must be interpreted liberally so as to advance their object rather than defeat legitimate claims on technical grounds.

4. Submissions by Counsel for the Respondent
Respondent State Counsel, on the basis of written instructions, submitted that the petitioner’s claim had been rightly rejected in accordance with Paragraph 11 of the Government Order dated 27.12.2016, as the intimation was not provided within 30 days from the commencement of treatment. It was contended that compliance with the prescribed timeline was necessary for processing such claims.
However, it was not disputed that no other ground for rejection of the claim existed on record.

5. Order of the Court
The Hon’ble Court, upon consideration of the rival submissions and the relevant Government Order, held that the requirement of submitting intimation within 30 days cannot be treated as mandatory in nature. The Court observed that the use of the expression “as far as possible” clearly indicates that the provision is directory and intended to ensure timely information to the authorities rather than to defeat genuine claims. The Court further emphasized that provisions relating to medical reimbursement are beneficial and partake the character of social welfare legislation, which must be interpreted in a liberal and purposive manner.
It was thus held that rejection of the petitioner’s claim solely on the ground of delay was erroneous.

Accordingly, the Court directed the competent authority to reconsider the petitioner’s claim expeditiously, with a direction to verify the medical bills within six weeks and to ensure payment within two weeks thereafter if the claim is found admissible. With these directions, the writ petition was allowed.

6. Case Laws Relied Upon

Mohinder Singh Gill & Others vs Chief Election Commissioner

May George vs Special Tahsildar

K.H. Nazar vs Mathew K. Jacob

Urmila Dixit vs Sunil Sharan Dixit

Brahampal @ Sammay vs National Insurance Company

Adv Swati Sinha
High Court, Lucknow

1. Details of the Case
Magghu Ram vs State of U.P. & Others
Writ - C No. 1779 of 2026
Before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench
Coram: Hon’ble Justice Subhash Vidyarthi

2. Facts of the Case
The petitioner, Magghu Ram, claimed ownership and possession over a portion of land bearing Plot No. 102 Ka situated in Ayodhya, which he had purchased along with his wife through a registered sale deed in 2005. However, the sale deed was executed only by some co-tenure holders and not all, despite the land being jointly recorded.

Subsequently, the petitioner sold a part of the land in 2013 and retained a smaller portion. A dispute arose when respondent no. 6 allegedly attempted to encroach upon the remaining land in possession of the petitioner.

The petitioner approached authorities and ultimately invoked Article 227 of the Constitution seeking directions to the District Magistrate under Section 22 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 for protection of life and property, along with police protection.

Meanwhile, it was brought on record that partition proceedings under the U.P. Revenue Code were already underway, and a revision was pending before the Additional Commissioner.

3. Submissions by Counsel for the Petitioner
The petitioner’s counsel argued that:
The District Magistrate is duty-bound under Section 22 of the Maintenance Act to ensure protection of life and property of the petitioner.
Authorities should intervene and provide police protection to prevent unlawful dispossession.

Reliance was placed on a prior order of the High Court in Gulab Kali vs State of U.P., to support the claim for intervention by the State authorities.

4. Submissions by Counsel for the Respondent
The State, relying on instructions from the Sub-Divisional Officer, contended that:
The land in question is part of a joint holding (Gata No. 102 Ka) with multiple recorded tenure holders.
Partition proceedings have already been initiated and are pending before the competent authority.
The dispute is essentially one of title and possession between private parties, and thus falls outside the purview of the Maintenance Act.

5. Order of the Court
The Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that:
The Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 is intended to provide maintenance and welfare to senior citizens, particularly against children or relatives, and not to adjudicate property disputes between unrelated parties.

It was further held that authorities under the Act, including the District Magistrate, do not have jurisdiction to decide disputes relating to title or possession of immovable property.

Such disputes require detailed adjudication involving pleadings, evidence, and trial, which can only be undertaken by competent civil or revenue courts.

Since partition proceedings were already pending before the revisional authority, no parallel remedy under the Maintenance Act could be invoked.

Accordingly, the petition was dismissed with liberty that the pending revision be decided on merits, uninfluenced by the dismissal of the present petition.

6. Case Laws Relied Upon
Gulab Kali vs State of U.P. & Others

Edited by
Adv. Swati Sinha
High Court
Lucknow