Duke Center for International Development (DCID)

Spotlight: Aye Nyein Thu MIDP'26

“Education is freedom.”

For Aye Nyein Thu, that belief comes from lived experience. Growing up and working in Myanmar, she saw how development is shaped by conflict, politics, and deeply human realities on the ground.

She returned to the classroom in the Duke Master of International Development Policy program to deepen that understanding, connecting years of hands-on development work with the global systems that shape policy and impact.

Now, she’s preparing to carry that knowledge forward, with a focus on more inclusive, context-sensitive approaches to development.

Read her story: https://duke.is/thu-sanford26

Master's projects written, presented and submitted ✔️

From AI policy and digital infrastructure to wealth inequality, carbon pricing, artivism ecosystems, and energy sector reform, this year’s projects reflect the diverse interests and experiences of the Duke Master of International Development Policy Class of 2026. Congrats to our MIDP fellows on reaching this milestone!

Are well-trained business managers less corrupt?

Edmund Malesky (Duke Center for International Development director), Tuan-Ngoc Phan (Duke PhD alumnus), Yi (Daniel) Xu (Duke Economics) and Rob Fetter (DCID senior fellow) argue that better managers are less likely to cut regulatory corners and therefore less reliant on bribes to avoid fines by regulatory inspectors.

In the journal article, "Do better managers bribe less? Cross-national and experimental evidence," the authors present two theories of change that illustrate how better management practices can reduce incentives to pay bribes during regulatory inspections. Their analysis includes findings from two interconnected studies: a cross-national business survey and a field experiment that provided management training courses to randomly assigned firms in Vietnam.

Read the Business and Politics (Cambridge University Press & Assessment) article: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/business-and-politics/article/do-better-managers-bribe-less-crossnational-and-experimental-evidence/DD4C2BB5C2C9F3654C315C0A07737D89